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Inward Investment in Peripheral Regions: Ireland
Firms engage in operations in countries or regions outside their home coun-
try/region essentially in order to enhance or protect their profitability. The 
nature of these operations will vary depending on the nature of the firm’s 
business, the way in which its business operations are configured, and those 
characteristics of both home and host countries/regions which impinge on 
the firm’s profitability. Most commonly, firms invest in other regions in or-
der to reduce costs (via, for example, cheap labour, financial incentives or a 
permissive regulatory environment) or to gain or enhance access to mar-
kets, raw materials, technology, skilled workers or specialist input suppliers 
(Dicken 1998; Dunning 1993, 2000).
Whereas in its early days foreign direct investment (FDI—where a 
firm invests in an overseas operation over which it has direct control) was 
mainly concerned with gaining access to resources or overseas markets, in 
the 1950s and 1960s the search for sources of cheap labour also assumed 
considerable importance in decisions to move manufacturing production 
overseas. The main pull factor was the availability of supplies of cheaper 
labour elsewhere, augmented in many cases by various incentives (tax 
breaks, labour subsidies, etc.) offered by governments in certain countries 
and regions. Meanwhile, in many developed countries, the post-World War 
II period saw the emergence of government policies designed to attract 
industrial investment to peripheral regions, including both regions which 
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had never experienced industrialization, and formerly prosperous industrial 
regions which were experiencing a lack of competitiveness leading to long-
term decline (see chapter 4). 
Investments subsequently attracted to both newly-industrializ-
ing countries (NICs) and peripheral regions within advanced economies 
had several features in common. Firstly, they almost exclusively involved 
manufacturing branch plants which imported the great bulk of their ma-
terials and whose output was almost entirely exported. As a consequence, 
the countries/regions in which such plants were located became known as 
“export platforms.” Such plants typically functioned as economic enclaves 
within their host regions, developing very few linkages with local businesses 
and reinvesting little of their profit locally. Secondly, in addition to invest-
ments in traditional, low-tech sectors such as clothing and toys, new branch 
plants were also to be found in more modern sectors such as electronic and 
electrical appliances. Normally, however, these plants were only engaged 
in the most labour-intensive stages (such as assembly of appliances and 
sub-assemblies or sewing of clothing) in the production chain involved in 
transforming raw materials into final products. 
Overall, the migration of manufacturing branch plants to peripheral 
regions and countries has had the effect of creating new spatial divisions of 
labour in the global economy (Massey 1984). At the international level, this 
has taken the form of the so-called “new” international division of labour 
(NIDL), whereby underdeveloped economies, in addition to the primary-
producing functions which marked their role in the “old” international divi-
sion of labour originally identified by Karl Marx (see chapter 4), also be-
came involved in routine, low-skill manufacturing functions relocated from 
the developed core economies (Fröbel et al. 1980).
Inward investment of the type described above became an increasingly 
central element of the economies of both Northern Ireland (henceforth 
the “North”) and the Republic of Ireland (the “South”) in the period since 
World War II and particularly since the 1960s. In the case of the North, 
such investment was designed to replace those established indigenous in-
dustrial sectors which were undergoing long-term decline (especially linen 
textiles and shipbuilding), whereas in the South the principal motivation 
was to create a strong industrial base in a country whose economy hitherto 
had been dominated by agriculture. The rest of this chapter describes and 
evaluates the experience of both economies with respect to inward invest-
ment. Two sections outline the measures originally introduced to attract 
outside investment in the two regions and the subsequent performance of 
these measures. The following sections focus on the difficulties experienced 
with inward investment in the North and South in the 1970s and 1980s, 
and the policy responses designed to tackle these difficulties. The more re-
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cent situation is then considered, with particular attention being devoted to 
the surge of inward investment, which was a central element in producing 
the so-called “Celtic Tiger” phenomenon in the South. The chapter con-
cludes with some observations on the possible future trajectory of inward 
investment policies in the two economies, with particular reference to the 
possibility of a move to North-South collaboration in the promotion of 
inward investment arising from the so-called peace process in the North.
Early Development of Inward Investment
in Northern Ireland 1945-1970
As detailed in chapter 4, the industrial base, founded largely on the ship-
building and linen industries, which had been created in Northern Ireland 
in the 19th century, came under severe pressure from technological change 
and competition from elsewhere in the second quarter of the 20th century. 
In line with the general trend in the U.K. as regards the rehabilitation of 
depressed industrial regions, in 1945 the Belfast government enacted the 
Industries Development Act and provided financial assistance for employ-
ment creation in new industrial undertakings, mainly in the form of grants 
towards the cost of buildings and equipment. Subsequent legislation in the 
1950s provided assistance to existing Northern Irish firms seeking to mod-
ernize and expand. 
With investment by indigenous firms falling to negligible levels in the 
1950s, new industrial jobs almost entirely originated from firms moving to 
Northern Ireland from elsewhere. Initially these came almost exclusively 
from Britain, but in the late 1950s American branch plants also began to 
arrive in significant numbers. By 1960, one in six manufacturing jobs in 
the North was in firms which had received state financial assistance (most 
of them externally-controlled). However, this new employment creation 
only partially counterbalanced the decline in indigenous industry which 
occurred in this period.
In the 1960s, the decline in traditional manufacturing accelerated 
alarmingly, with employment in shipbuilding falling by no less than 60 per 
cent and that in textiles and clothing by 16 per cent. In this decade, however, 
the contraction of indigenous industry was almost entirely balanced out by 
the growth of employment in new projects, almost all of them externally-
sourced. A key factor here was the general strengthening of regional policy 
in the U.K., and especially the more rigorous application of the industrial 
development certificates legislation which sought to restrict the opening 
of new manufacturing plants in the more prosperous southeast and west 
midlands regions of England. In this decade a very generous battery of in-
centives for industrial investment was put in place by the Northern Ireland 
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government, including grants of up to 63 per cent of the cost of buildings 
and equipment (compared with around 50 per cent in the case of the De-
velopment Areas in Britain), industrial site and advance factory provision, 
industrial fuel and labour training subsidies, housing for key workers and 
business advisory services (Murie et al. 1974). It has been estimated that the 
North’s superior incentives led to the creation of 40,000 extra manufactur-
ing jobs in the region in the 1960s compared with what would have been 
the case had levels of support similar to those in Britain’s development areas 
been available instead (Moore et al. 1978). This amounted to almost one-
quarter of total manufacturing employment at the end of the decade.
The surge of inward investment into Northern Ireland in the 1960s was 
again dominated by British firms, but also featured strong growth from the 
U.S. By 1973, externally-controlled plants accounted for just over one-half 
of total manufacturing employment, with British firms representing three-
quarters and U.S. firms one-fifth of the external sector (Hamilton 1993). 
A key feature of inward investment in this period was its domination by 
a number of very large projects, attracted by the North’s generous capital 
grants regime. These projects were mainly in the electrical engineering and 
especially the synthetic textiles sectors. Investment in the latter sector ac-
counted for one-half of all industrial investment in the North between 1967 
and 1974, by which time one-quarter of all U.K. synthetic fibre production 
capacity was located in the region (Harrison 1990).
Overall, therefore, while total manufacturing employment in the North 
fell only very slightly (by just 2 per cent) in the 1960s, this masked a very 
major shift which had occurred in the structure of the manufacturing sector, 
with the traditional and largely indigenously-owned linen and shipbuilding 
sectors having undergone substantial contraction, to be replaced by plants 
in more modern, technologically sophisticated and predominantly exter-
nally-controlled sectors, particularly electrical engineering, chemicals and 
synthetic fibres.
Early Development of Inward Investment
in the Republic of Ireland 1959-1973
The adoption, in the late 1950s, of an inward investment policy by the gov-
ernment of the Republic of Ireland was in response to the growing crisis 
which it faced as the policy of protectionism adopted in the 1930s ran up 
against the limits of a very small domestic market and a chronic balance of 
payments deficit arising from the need to import industrial inputs with-
out compensatory growth in industrial exports. With industrial employ-
ment growth having come to a standstill and the adjacent British economy 
booming, the rate of outmigration from the South reached unprecedented 
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levels: a total of 440,000 people left the country during the 1950s—one in 
seven of the entire population.
A number of measures introduced in a piecemeal fashion during the 
1950s paved the way for the adoption of a full-blooded inward investment 
policy by the end of the decade, including grants to encourage industrial 
investment and tax relief on profits derived from exports, which was ini-
tially designed to stimulate exports by Irish firms. The restrictions on for-
eign control of Irish-based industry, which had been a key element of the 
economic nationalist policy introduced in the 1930s were also gradually re-
laxed and the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) was established to 
promote industrial investment. The emerging policy of basing national eco-
nomic development on export-oriented industrialization, in which inward 
investment would have a key role, was formalized in the First Programme 
for Economic Expansion (1959-1963) which committed the Republic of 
Ireland to an outward-looking development path. 
An impressive package of incentives designed to attract foreign invest-
ment was in place by 1960. Capital grants of up to two-thirds of the cost of 
fixed assets along with labour training grants could be paid to new indus-
trial undertakings. Complete relief from corporation tax on profits derived 
from exports was available to new firms for a period of fifteen years. The 
IDA was in the process of building a network of overseas offices and quickly 
gained a reputation as a very effective investment promotion agency. A final 
major component in the package of attractions which the Republic was able 
to offer foreign investors was a substantial reservoir of labour which, despite 
lacking technical skills, had a generally good level of basic education and 
was prepared to accept levels of remuneration significantly below the norm 
in both the U.K. and the more advanced economies of continental Europe.
The attractiveness of this package was reflected in the gradual build-
up of overseas investment in the South during the 1960s, with a particular 
boost being provided by the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement, con-
cluded in 1965, which provided duty-free access to the British market for 
manufacturing firms based in the Republic of Ireland. This investment, in 
turn, underpinned the recovery of manufacturing employment growth fol-
lowing the stagnation of the 1950s. Whereas manufacturing employment 
grew by just three thousand (less than 2 per cent) in the latter decade, this 
leapt to 36,000 (20 per cent) in the 1960s. There was also strong growth 
in average output per manufacturing worker, reflecting, to a considerable 
extent, the more modern technology introduced by foreign firms in this 
period (Kennedy et al. 1988). 
About 70 per cent of additional employment created up to 1974 in firms 
in receipt of new industry grants was in foreign firms (McAleese 1977). The 
U.S. was by far the most important source, accounting for 37 per cent of 
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all new foreign-firm employment, followed by the U.K. (20 per cent), the 
Netherlands (15 per cent) and Germany (13 per cent). There was, how-
ever, a considerable amount of further employment in already-established 
foreign-owned firms which did not receive grant assistance in this period. 
These were mainly British firms, which either predated independence or 
had received exemptions from the restrictions on foreign-owned enterprise 
during the protectionist period. Total employment in foreign-owned firms 
in 1974 amounted to about 28 per cent of total manufacturing employment 
and was mainly made up of British (43 per cent) and American (27 per 
cent) firms (Ó Súilleabháin 1982).
While new foreign firms were engaged in a wide range of activities, 
by far the leading sector was metals and engineering, whose share of total 
manufacturing employment rose from 16 per cent in 1960 to 23 per cent in 
1973, at the expense of the food and drink and textiles and clothing sectors. 
Foreign firms, therefore, were contributing both to a sectoral diversification 
and technological upgrading of the industrial structure. A further signifi-
cant feature of new foreign investment was its relative tendency to avoid 
Dublin and other large urban centres and to opt instead for smaller towns, 
especially in the west of the country (Gillmor 1985; O’Farrell 1975). This 
latter tendency may be attributed in part to deliberate government encour-
agement of spatial dispersal of new investment, and partly to a preference 
among investing firms for the lower costs and what was perceived to be less 
troublesome labour available in rural areas (Breathnach 1985).
The 1970s: The North and South Go Their Separate Ways
In the 1960s the Northern and Southern economies grew increasingly alike. 
In the North, despite the contraction of the 1950s, the level of manufac-
turing employment was still relatively high and was largely sustained by 
the replacement of declining indigenous industry by a surge of new in-
dustrial firms moving in from outside the region. In the South, industrial 
employment, which had experienced a temporary surge in the early days 
of protectionism, was again raised substantially by the growth in inward 
investment. Thus, not only had the gap between the two economies in the 
level of industrialization that prevailed at the time of partition been greatly 
narrowed, but the dependence of the two economies on externally-con-
trolled branch plants had grown substantially. In the North, by 1973 more 
than half (53 per cent) of all manufacturing employment was in externally-
controlled firms (Hamilton 1993); in the South the figure was 26 per cent 
and rising rapidly.
In the 1970s, however, the two economies had profoundly differing 
industrial experiences. In the North this was reflected in a major decline in 
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manufacturing employment, which fell by no less than one-quarter during 
the course of the decade. What was new about this was that not only did 
the contraction in the traditional industries continue, it was combined with 
equally rapid decline in the externally-controlled sector. The main factor 
involved here was a very severe drop in employment in the synthetic textiles 
sector, which had played the central role in the growth of inward invest-
ment in the previous decade. While the international recession triggered off 
by the severe oil price increase imposed in 1973 by the Organization of Oil-
Producing Countries (OPEC) had a general dampening on global markets, 
it particularly affected the synthetic fibres sector for which oil was the basic 
raw material. The resulting loss of competitiveness vis-à-vis natural-fibre-
based textiles was further exacerbated by another major rise in oil prices in 
1979. Meanwhile, growing imports of synthetics from both the U.S. and 
the developing world placed additional pressure on the U.K. industry in 
particular. In 1980 alone, Northern Ireland lost 73 per cent of its synthetic 
fibre producing capacity. An industry which in 1974 employed more than 
10,000 had all but disappeared ten years later (Harrison 1990).
The decline in the externally-controlled sector was not confined to 
synthetic textiles; the mechanical and electrical engineering sectors also 
reported significant job losses. Overall, the external sector accounted for 
about half of the decline in manufacturing employment in the North in the 
1970s, with British firms in turn accounting for almost all of the net loss 
in the external sector. The final key factor in the severe contraction of the 
North’s manufacturing sector in this decade was the collapse in new inward 
investment after 1970. This may be attributed in part to the recessionary 
state of the global economy through much of the decade and in part to the 
secular decline of the British industrial economy (which hitherto had been 
the principal source of inward investment to the North). Clearly, another 
key factor was the deterring impact of the outbreak of political unrest in the 
region in the late 1960s. There has been much debate over the impact of the 
political troubles on employment in the region, due mainly to the difficul-
ties involved in establishing the likely counterfactual situation (Bradley and 
Dowling 1983; Gibson 1983; Munck 1993; Simpson 1983). Those esti-
mates place the manufacturing employment loss (mainly in the form of new 
inward investment forgone) in the 1970s in the region of 25-50,000 (i.e., 
between 19 and 38 per cent of manufacturing employment at the end of the 
decade) (Canning et al. 1987; Gudgin et al. 1989; Rowthorn 1981).
The overall decline in manufacturing employment in the North in the 
1970s would undoubtedly have been much worse were it not for a signifi-
cant level of expansion among surviving firms and greatly expanded invest-
ment in new indigenous projects, particularly in the small and medium en-
terprise (SME) sector. The promotion of the latter sector was the particular 
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responsibility of the Local Economic Development Unit (LEDU), set up 
in 1971. Harrison (1986) has suggested that the indigenous sector had been 
largely neglected during the high period of inward investment in the 1960s 
and it was only when it became clear in the 1970s that the external sec-
tor could no longer cater for the North’s industrial employment needs that 
renewed efforts were made to stimulate growth among indigenous firms. 
Harrison points to this as one of the ways in which an over-reliance on 
inward investment can have a negative impact on endogenous development 
in a branch-plant economy.
By contrast, in the 1970s the South experienced a major surge of new 
inward investment. This was principally triggered by entry to the EEC in 
January 1973, which meant that the Republic of Ireland could now be used 
as a low-cost base for accessing the huge EEC market. This was particu-
larly attractive to U.S. firms seeking a production location inside the EEC’s 
Common External Tariff, especially as Ireland was English-speaking, had 
strong cultural links with the U.S., was strongly pro-American, had familiar 
legal and financial systems and politically was both stable and conserva-
tive. Between 1973 and 1981, employment in foreign manufacturing firms 
grew by more than 40 per cent; U.S. firms accounted for 80 per cent of this 
growth. As a result, the U.S. share of foreign-firm employment rose from 27 
to 41 per cent. During the same period, there was an actual decline of more 
than 20 per cent in employment in British firms, so that their share of total 
foreign-firm employment fell from 46 to 26 per cent. Thus, the decline in 
British investment in the North in the 1970s was, to an extent, replicated 
in the South. Indigenous industry—generally inefficient, concentrated in 
traditional sectors and increasingly exposed to external competition at a 
time of international recession—also experienced considerable contraction 
in this period. As a result, the foreign sector’s share of manufacturing em-
ployment rose from 26 to 35 per cent.
Foreign investment in the South in the 1970s was mainly concentrated 
in the metals & engineering and chemicals & pharmaceuticals (henceforth 
“pharmachems”) sectors. In terms of engineering, a key new growth sub-
sector was electronics assembly, reflecting the contemporary growth of this 
sector in the U.S. Ireland became a particular target of young, rapidly-grow-
ing firms seeking the cash-flow benefits of the zero tax rate. By contrast, in-
vestment in the pharmachems sector tended to be in large, capital-intensive 
plants producing bulk chemicals. 
The nature of the Irish operations of foreign firms in these sectors 
throws some interesting light on the concept of the new international divi-
sion of labour, popularized in the 1970s. To a considerable extent, the Irish 
electronics industry as it developed in that decade conformed with the ste-
reotypical image of electronics assembly plants located in free trade zones in 
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east and southeast Asia. Thus, Irish electronics plants were characterized by 
a preponderance of unskilled assembly “operatives” who in turn were mainly 
young, single women. At the same time, the Irish plants were significantly 
different from their Asian counterparts in several respects (Wickham and 
Murray 1987). In the first place, whereas typically in the case of the latter, 
90 per cent or more of the workforce comprised operatives, in the Irish case 
the figure was just 57 per cent in 1981. While this was still well above the 
U.S. average of one-third, Irish electronics plants still included a substantial 
proportion of scientists, technologists and technicians. This reflected the 
fact that, while Asian assembly plants tended to specialize in mass produc-
tion of sub-assemblies and consumer products, in Ireland there was more 
of an emphasis on batch production of more complex products (computers, 
instruments and industrial control systems). Furthermore, while the Asian 
plants generally sent their products back to their parent firms (usually in the 
U.S.) for final assembly, the Irish plants were mainly involved in producing 
final products for the European market.
Nevertheless, the Irish electronics industry in the 1970s was a labour-
intensive industry and that the majority of the industry’s workforce con-
sisted of unskilled operatives. The availability of a substantial reservoir of 
such workers at low cost therefore was an important reason for locating in 
Ireland. For firms in the pharmachems sector, the reasons for locating in 
Ireland appear to have been quite different. While the sector is made up 
of a diverse range of activities, it has been dominated, in investment and 
output terms, by a relatively small group of capital-intensive plants involved 
in the bulk production of active medical ingredients. Because of the high 
quality standards required of these plants and their sophisticated produc-
tion technology, they generally have tended to employ an above-average 
proportion of technically-skilled workers (engineers, chemists, technicians, 
craft workers). 
This is a sector dominated internationally by very large firms which 
exploit their oligopolistic strength and the protection of patents to generate 
high profits (Telesis Consultancy Group 1982). For these firms, the prime 
attraction of locating in Ireland has been the low tax rate. These firms op-
erate globally-integrated production systems, with different stages in the 
production chain located in different countries, thereby generating a high 
level of material flows between vertically-linked plants. The prices applied 
to transactions between these plants (so-called “transfer prices”) can be ma-
nipulated so that overall profits are concentrated in those plants located in 
the countries with the lowest tax rates (Dicken 1998). It is hardly surpris-
ing, therefore, that the pharmachems branch plants located in Ireland por-
tray a high level of linkage with affiliate plants overseas, either as sources of 
raw materials or as recipients of outputs. Thus, McAleese (1977) found that, 
Inward Investment to Ireland     141
while a high level of inter-affiliate trade was a common feature of foreign 
branch plants in Ireland, it was particularly highly-developed among phar-
machems plants which sold 93 per cent of their exports to affiliates. 
Overall, then, we can conclude that no simple stereotypes can be ap-
plied to the manner in which the Republic of Ireland was incorporated into 
the international economy in the 1960s and 1970s. Different sectors, and 
different firms within sectors, were drawn to Ireland for different reasons, 
usually multiple, which varied from case to case. Ireland’s success in attract-
ing inward investment in this period, therefore, may be attributed to the 
broad spectrum of advantages that the country offered. 
Because of their labour-intensive nature, foreign-owned electronics 
(and electrical engineering) plants had a substantial impact on the structure 
of industrial employment in the South during the 1970s. Thus, the share of 
total manufacturing employment taken by the metals and engineering sector 
jumped from 15 per cent in 1971 to 24 per cent in 1981. Because of its capi-
tal-intensive nature, the impact of foreign investment in the pharmachems 
sector was felt more in terms of industrial output and exports than of em-
ployment. The sector’s output grew by 187 per cent in volume terms between 
1970 and 1979 compared with 59 per cent for all industry, while its share 
of total industrial output doubled to 17 per cent between 1973 and 1984. 
In spatial terms, a key feature of the 1970s in the South was the de-
liberate pursuit of a systematic dispersal policy by the IDA, which in 1969 
had been given statutory responsibility for regional industrial planning 
(Breathnach 1982, 1985). The objective of this policy appears to have been 
to achieve a share of total manufacturing employment in each region com-
parable to its share of the national population (previously the more urban-
ized regions, and especially the East region containing Dublin, had dis-
proportionately large shares of manufacturing employment). The principal 
measures utilized by the IDA in pursuit of its dispersal policy included 
an extensive program of advance (ready-built) factory construction; spatial 
variation in the grants offered to prospective investors and selective show-
ings of possible investment locations to such investors. 
The IDA’s success in promoting western locations among incoming in-
vestors may be seen in the fact that, in 1981, the proportion of total manu-
facturing employment accounted for by foreign firms was around 50 per 
cent in the northwest, west and midwest regions while it was much less in 
the east, northeast and southeast (Gillmor 1985). By the beginning of the 
1980s the regional distribution of manufacturing industry was largely in 
line with that of the population. This was, to a considerable extent, a conse-
quence of the movement of new inward investment to the western regions. 
However, a second important contributory factor was the simultaneous loss 
of jobs in the more urbanized eastern regions, as existing indigenous indus-
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try began to encounter severe competitive pressures from 1973 on due to a 
combination of EEC entry and international recession.
The 1980s: Inward Investment in Crisis
The beginning of the 1980s coincided with the most severe international 
economic recession since the 1930s. As a consequence, international trade 
stagnated and levels of overseas investment by transnational companies 
contracted for the first time since World War II, involving a combination 
of cutbacks in new investments and withdrawals from existing investments 
(Dicken 1998). This had serious implications for economies that had become 
heavily dependent on inward investment, including both parts of Ireland.
In the North, the headlong fall in manufacturing employment, which 
had appeared in the 1970s, accelerated further in the early 1980s. Total 
manufacturing employment, which had stood at 196,000 in 1950, dipped 
below the 100,000 mark in 1983 before recovering somewhat in the follow-
ing years as the nadir of the recession passed. With employment in indig-
enous firms holding relatively steady, the bulk of the decline in the manu-
facturing sector occurred in the external sector, where the number of jobs 
in 1986 was less than half the 1973 level (table 7.1). By 1986 employment 
in British firms was down to one-third of its 1973 level, while employ-
ment in U.S. firms fell by one-third in the same period. The share of total 
manufacturing employment taken by externally-controlled firms was down 
to 41 per cent compared with 52 per cent in 1973. Of the overall decline in 
manufacturing employment between 1973 and 1986, more than two-thirds 
occurred in the external sector.
All the major industrial sectors shared in the decline of the external 
sector. The synthetic textiles sector had been decimated while the number 
of jobs in externally-controlled traditional textiles and clothing firms was 
halved. Even in the modern electrical and instrument engineering sector, 
Nationality Employment
1973
Employment
1986
Change
1973-86
% Change 
1973-86
GB 64,400 22,300 -42,100 -65.3
USA 17,300 11,700 -5,600 -32.4
Other foreign 5,800 7,700 +1,700 +29.3
Total external
As % total NI
87,500
51.8
41,700
40.6
-45,800
69.1
-52.3
n.a.
Northern Ireland 81,400 60,900 -20,500 -25.2
Total 168,900 102,600 -66,300 -39.3
Table 7.1 Manufacturing Employment Change, Northern Ireland, 1973-1986
Sources: Hamilton 1993; Northern Ireland Economic Council 1992
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employment was down by almost 60 per cent (Hamilton 1993). An impor-
tant factor in the decline in the external sector in this period was that new 
inward investment, which had recovered slightly in the late 1970s, fell to a 
trickle in the early 1980s. However, the resumption of strong growth in in-
ternational investment associated with the recovery of the global economy 
in the second half of the 1980s was reflected in the North in a significant, 
but still minor, growth in new inward investment. 
In the South, the early 1980s also witnessed a shakeout in foreign sec-
tor employment, although it was not nearly as severe as that experienced in 
the North. Yet, with indigenous employment contracting even more rapidly, 
the share of total manufacturing employment accounted for by the foreign 
sector actually rose, from 38 per cent in 1981 to 41 per cent in 1987. In that 
year, the proportion of manufacturing employment in external firms in the 
South exceeded that in the North for the first time. As in the North, there 
was something of a recovery of inward investment towards the end of the 
1980s, so that by 1990 employment in foreign firms had regained the level 
of 1981, but had further risen as a proportion of total manufacturing em-
ployment to 43 per cent (compared with 39 per cent in the North).
Whereas the level of penetration of the manufacturing sector by exter-
nally-controlled firms in both parts of Ireland was broadly similar in 1990, 
there were some significant differences between the two economies in terms 
of the structure of the external sector (Northern Ireland Economic Council 
1992). In the North, the dominant sector remained textiles and clothing, 
accounting for 34 per cent of external sector employment compared with 
just 13 per cent in the South (table 7.2). By contrast, by far the leading sec-
tor in the South was metals and engineering (46 per cent of employment 
compared with 27 per cent in the North). These sectoral differences were 
reflected in the nationality of external firms. In the North, 57 per cent of 
employment was in British firms (down from 74 per cent in 1973) with the 
U.S. a long way behind at 23 per cent. In the South, U.S. firms accounted 
for 48 per cent of foreign-firm employment (up from one-quarter in 1973) 
while the British share had fallen to 19 per cent from 46 per cent in 1973. 
Thus, it can be argued that the switch from British to American investment 
in the South was associated with a movement into more modern and tech-
nologically advanced sectors, whereas the continuing dominance of Great 
Britain as a source of inward investment in the North meant the continued 
dominance of more traditional and slow-growing types of industry.
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Emerging Critiques of Inward Investment Policy
The early years of inward investment policy in the North (the 1950s and 
1960s) and the South (1960s and 1970s) witnessed strong growth in em-
ployment in externally-controlled firms in both jurisdictions, leading to a 
general acceptance of the merits of such policy. However, with the external 
sector running into difficulties on both sides of the border, a growing vol-
ume of literature critical of the high level of reliance on inward investment, 
both North and South, began to emerge. There has been a marked similarity 
in many of the key criticisms of inward investment, which were articulated 
in both regions in the 1980s and early 1990s (e.g. Bradley and Dowling 
1983; Hamilton 1993; Harris 1990; O’Malley 1989). These include the in-
stability of employment created by externally-controlled firms; their lack 
of local linkages and local profit reinvestment; their narrow range of func-
tions and emphasis on low-skill work; the high public cost of attracting 
and maintaining inward investment; and the relative neglect of indigenous 
industry caused by excessive focus on the foreign sector. 
Perhaps the most trenchant critique of inward investment to appear in 
either jurisdiction was that contained in a review of industrial policy con-
ducted on behalf of the Southern government’s think-tank, the National 
Economic and Social Policy, by the American Telesis Consultancy Group 
1973 1990
As % total manufacturing employment
Northern Ireland
Republic of Ireland 5331
39
45
Share of British firms (%)
Northern Ireland
Republic of Ireland 7446
57
19
Share of US firms (%)
Northern Ireland
Republic of Ireland 2025
23
48
Share of Textiles & Clothing (%)
Northern Ireland
Republic of Ireland 3118
34
13
Share of Metals & Engineering (%)
Northern Ireland
Republic of Ireland 2220
27
46
Table 7.2 Externally-controlled Manufacturing Industry, Northern Ireland and Republic of 
Ireland, 1973 and 1990
Sources: Northern Ireland Economic Council 1992; Telesis Consultancy Group 1982.
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(Telesis Consultancy Group 1982). In a celebrated passage, Telesis sum-
marized the drawbacks of the foreign manufacturing sector in the South 
as follows:
Foreign-owned industrial operations in Ireland with few exceptions do 
not embody the key competitive activities of the businesses in which they 
participate, do not employ significant numbers of skilled workers; and are 
not significantly integrated into traded and skilled sub-supply industries 
in Ireland. (1982: 151)
Telesis saw the package of attractions offered by the Irish government to 
inward investors as being too generous relative to what was being offered in 
other countries and recommended a major cutback in grant levels. While 
acknowledging the importance of the tax concession in attracting invest-
ment to Ireland, Telesis decried the concession as inhibiting the develop-
ment of backward linkages in Ireland (as imports of inputs from affiliates 
abroad was crucial to the transfer price manipulation which allowed global 
profits to be concentrated in Ireland) and as hindering the location of R&D 
and administrative functions in Ireland (since it was more tax-efficient to 
set off the cost of these against tax liabilities in high-tax jurisdictions).
More fundamentally, Telesis questioned the long-term wisdom of an 
industrial development policy based largely on the attraction of inward in-
vestment: “No country has successfully achieved high incomes without a 
strong base of indigenously owned resource-based or manufacturing com-
panies in traded businesses” (1982: 26). Accordingly, Telesis recommended 
a major shift towards the cultivation of indigenous industry in the applica-
tion of the state’s industrial development resources. Similarly, in the North 
there have been calls for a greater emphasis on indigenous firms and for 
measures to upgrade the functions of externally-controlled firms (Borooah 
1993; Gudgin et al. 1989; Hamilton 1993).
In the South, criticism of the inward investment policy were accentu-
ated in the 1980s when it became apparent that the output of foreign firms 
was continuing to grow strongly through the recessionary early years of the 
decade, despite significant job losses in the foreign sector (Department of 
Industry and Commerce 1990). It was now apparent that considerations 
other than economic recession, and particularly automation and new pro-
duction technologies, were involved in manufacturing job loss. This posed 
a particularly serious challenge to an industrial policy that was primarily 
based on direct employment creation in manufacturing plants. Growing 
concern with the failure of industrial growth to translate into employment 
growth (the unemployment rate exceeded 21 per cent in 1987 despite the 
resumption of large-scale emigration) was the primary reason for the insti-
gation in 1991 of a further major review of industrial policy. 
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The resultant report of the Industrial Policy Review Group (popularly 
known as the Culliton Report after the Group’s chairman), published in 
1991, reiterated the Telesis Group’s call for a shift in the balance of the 
industrial promotion effort to the indigenous sector, berated the marginal 
progress which had been made in this direction since the publication of the 
Telesis Report and complained of a lack of commitment to the develop-
ment of indigenous industry on the part of the relevant state organs (In-
dustrial Policy Review Group 1992). The report called for a new approach 
to industrial development based on the cultivation of integrated industrial 
clusters along the lines advocated by Porter (1990). While these clusters 
would largely be built around Irish-based firms, the primary role of future 
inward investment should be to contribute to the functioning of these clus-
ters rather than acting as stand-alone production operations. A similar ap-
proach to industrial development in Northern Ireland has been advocated 
by Clulow and Teague (1993).
Inward Investment and the Celtic Tiger
The growing chorus of criticism of the role of foreign investment in the 
South’s economic development, which emerged in the 1980s and early 
1990s was effectively silenced by the remarkable surge of new inward in-
vestment which occurred from 1993 on. Employment in foreign-owned 
manufacturing plants grew by more than one-third between 1993-2000. 
More significantly from a broader economic development point of view, 
the output of these plants almost trebled in real terms in the same period.1 
While indigenous manufacturing employment also grew significantly in 
this period, by 2000 the foreign sector accounted for 49 per cent of all 
manufacturing employment, compared with 43 per cent in 1990. Just two 
sectors accounted for virtually all of this growth—the electronics/informa-
tion technology (mainly data processing and communications equipment) 
and pharmachems sectors, which had been identified for priority targeting 
by the IDA in the late 1980s. 
A further key component of the 1990s inward investment surge was 
the international (i.e., export-oriented) services sector. The IDA had origi-
nally begun to support such activities in 1973, but they had remained a 
marginal element in the agency’s portfolio until the late 1980s when sig-
nificant growth in the software and financial services subsectors (the latter 
following the establishment of the International Financial Services Centre 
in Dublin in 1987) began to emerge. These continued their rapid growth 
through the 1990s, when they were joined by the teleservices sector, based 
on the centralization by a number of large transnational firms of their Eu-
ropean telephone call centre activities in Ireland (Breathnach 2000). Overall 
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employment in international services grew from 12,000 in 1991 to 62,000 
in 2000, of which growth foreign firms accounted for two-thirds.
The U.S. was by far the main source of inward investment into the 
South in the 1990s. By 1999 American firms accounted for 63 per cent of 
employment in IDA-assisted manufacturing and services firms. The share 
of the next most important source—the U.K.—was just 10 per cent. This 
late surge in inward investment is widely accepted as having been the main 
driving force behind very high economic growth rates, which saw Ireland 
being dubbed the “Celtic Tiger” (OECD 1999). The effects of the foreign 
sector on the indigenous economy have been greatly enhanced in two key 
ways. Firstly, while the proportion of foreign firms’ inputs sourced within 
Ireland has remained largely unchanged, the sheer scale of growth in the 
foreign sector has meant that the absolute level of local purchases has grown 
enormously—by three times in real terms between 1990-2000. Secondly, 
there has been a very considerable upgrading in the skill levels embodied in 
foreign firms’ operations in Ireland, reflecting the growing complexity and 
sophistication of the production technologies and products associated with 
these operations (Breathnach 1998). This has meant greatly increased wage 
and salary payments (which in 2000 were more than twice the 1990 level in 
real terms) with correspondingly greater multiplier effects arising from the 
spending of these salaries within the Irish economy.
While considerable debate surrounds the factors responsible for the 
1990s surge in foreign investment in Ireland, undoubtedly of key impor-
tance has been the growing demand for technically skilled workers among 
transnational firms in those sectors targeted by the IDA since the late 1980s, 
and the availability of a significant reservoir of such workers in Ireland due 
to rising education levels among the growing numbers of young people 
entering the labour force following a baby boom in the 1970s (Breathnach 
1998). Ireland has been a particularly attractive location for manufacturing 
firms producing differentiated products for segmented markets (e.g., medi-
cal devices and computers), subject to rapid technological change, involving 
sophisticated production technology and requiring a production base close 
to the western European market (Breathnach 2000). Alternatively, the de-
velopment of information and communications technologies has allowed 
Ireland to be utilized as a cost-effective base for the provision of informa-
tion-based services (financial services, teleservices, software development) 
to international markets (Breathnach 2000).
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The Recovery of Inward Investment
in Northern Ireland in the 1990s
Following a further dip in the early 1990s, new inward investment in the 
North picked up again as the decade progressed. This latest investment 
phase has had three distinguishing features.2 Firstly, as in the South, a large 
proportion was in service activities, which now account for about 40 per 
cent of externally-controlled firms in receipt of assistance by Invest North-
ern Ireland, the new agency set up in 2002 to promote business investment 
in the province. Secondly, in the manufacturing sector, there has been a 
significant level of investment in knowledge-based high-technology sectors 
which helps explain the North’s far superior manufacturing output perfor-
mance compared to U.K. norms in recent years: between 1997 and 2001, 
manufacturing output increased by 22 per cent compared to an increase of 
only 3 per cent for the U.K. as a whole. Almost all of this output growth was 
accounted for by the electrical, electronic and optical equipment subsectors. 
These new activities have also helped transform the economy’s sectoral pro-
file: between 1995 and 2002 the proportion of manufacturing employees in 
the engineering and “other manufacturing” sectors rose from 46 to 57 per 
cent while that in clothing and textiles fell from 25 to 13 per cent. And, 
thirdly, much of the recent inward investment has emanated from the U.S. 
such that American firms now account for 29 per cent of externally-con-
trolled firms compared with 33 per cent British.
Future Outlook
Both the North and the South experienced reductions in manufacturing 
employment in the early years of the 21st century. These are most likely a 
consequence of the general global economic downturn associated with the 
collapse of the dot.com bubble. At the same time, there have been certain 
features of recent job losses in the South in particular which may have more 
long-term implications. Indications are that these losses are occurring in 
more routine forms of manufacturing where labour costs remain impor-
tant and which have come under increasing pressure with the general rise 
of labour costs during the last decade. At the same time, the IDA reports 
a continued brisk inflow of more high-tech investments in such areas as 
medical devices, pharmaceuticals and software.
With unemployment rates in the South having fallen to historically 
low levels, the IDA has moved away from its traditional mission of creating 
employment per se to a new remit of increasing the value added to the Irish 
economy via inward investment and of achieving a broader regional dis-
persal of inward investment. The latter consideration has arisen due to the 
strong tendency for recent foreign investment to locate in the larger urban 
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centres which contain pools of skilled workers and infrastructure appropri-
ate to service-type operations. 
Given the South’s much greater level of success in attracting inward in-
vestment in recent decades, and the contribution this investment has made 
to raising living standards to west European norms, some attention has 
been devoted to the possibilities, in the context of the peace process, of 
the North entering into some form of collaborative arrangement with the 
South in terms of the promotion of inward investment (Hamilton 1995). A 
joint approach to industrial promotion could eliminate unnecessary com-
petition and duplication of effort and might also force both sides to adopt a 
more critical and strategic view of the long-term role of inward investment 
in the broader economic development process. There will inevitably be con-
siderable political opposition in the North to the idea of adopting an invest-
ment promotion agenda largely based on a model developed initially by the 
South. Furthermore, to the extent that the South’s relative success in the 
attraction of inward investment has been dependent on the availability of a 
major tax concession, it would appear that a coordinated North-South ap-
proach, to be fully effective, would require the extension of this concession 
to the Northern jurisdiction. It is by no means certain, however, that this 
would be acceptable to the U.K. government, which has numerous other 
peripheral regions clamouring for inward investment.
Finally, there is the question of whether the pursuit of inward invest-
ment, whatever its qualities, is the best long-term approach to the develop-
ment of peripheral regions. Although the quality of recent investment in 
both North and South has been a definite improvement on what went be-
fore, it still remains poorly integrated into the host economies and contin-
gent on remote decision-making by people whose agendas may correspond 
little with Irish development needs. In the South, despite the entreaties of 
the Telesis and Culliton Reports, indigenous industry remains the poor re-
lation in the industrial development effort. This is not to say that there has 
not been considerable achievement in the promotion of home-based firms 
and sectors. But, where small Irish firms have to compete for the attention 
of the functionaries of the state with the likes of IBM, Intel and Hewlett 
Packard, there is really no contest.
Notes
1. Output levels in foreign firms operating in the Republic of Ireland are exag-
gerated to a considerable but unknown extent, by the effects of transfer price 
manipulation. However, trends in reported output over time probably reflect the 
pattern of growth in real output in the firms concerned.
2. Most of the data in the following paragraph are taken from the Invest Northern 
Ireland website: http://www.investni.com/ (accessed 10 June 2004).
